Major international oil companies have gradually shifted focus towards gas; to the extent that they are now sometimes jokingly referred to as Big Gas rather than Big Oil. For companies like Shell or BP gas now comprises more than 50 % of their total production.
Around 2010 this shift to gas still appeared to be very attractive. An expectation of continued high prices and demand growth (in particular in SE Asia) resulted in project sanction for a number of LNG projects, mostly in Australia. The 2011 IEA report “Are we entering a golden age of gas?” reflected the industry thinking at the time. The question mark in the title of the report was not taken too seriously; the rest of the report was.
To some extent this was done out of necessity rather than out of choice; replacing oil reserves had become increasingly difficult. Gas reserves are more accessible and have a wider global distribution. Cleaner gas was expected to take away market share from coal due to environmental concerns. As a transition fuel it should allow the majors to continue to grow without having to dramatically change their business model.
The strategy to move away from oil has now run into problems. Gas demand forecasts have been reduced. The onset of gas oversupply resulted in a dramatic drop in Asian gas spot prices in 2014. The subsequent, unrelated, drop in oil prices (resulting in lower gas prices for gas sold on oil-indexed contracts) exacerbated the situation for gas producers. At the same time a number of LNG projects, which have experienced large cost overruns, are about to come on the market. For the coming years the supply demand balance for gas and LNG looks worse than it does for oil.
In addition to this typical boom and bust cycle (be it one with what now looks like a prolonged bust) there are a number of more fundamental reasons why I feel that gas (and in particular high cost LNG) is systematically less profitable than oil and why the strategy of the majors to increasingly focus on gas is ill-fated:
- Gas is a global free market; oil is not (and hence oil trades at a premium)
- Gas is expensive to transport. Gas transport cost is often higher than the cost of feed in gas
- Gas faces stronger competition than oil
- Shale gas is a stronger competitor to gas than shale oil to oil
Gas is a global free market, oil is not.
Oil prices are higher than what they would be in a global free market. OPEC may be an organization whose members are often not able to reach an agreement but even a poorly functioning cartel is better for oil prices than no cartel.
Low cost Middle East producers are not producing to their full geological potential, whether due to political instability or due to a policy to maximize revenue rather than volume in the long term. As a result their reserves over production ratios are relatively high. Additional oil can still be developed in a country like Saudi Arabia at a cost way below that of deepwater oil or shale oil. They chose not to do so as gaining a substantial amount of market share will result in a much longer period of low oil prices than merely defending market share.
For gas, there is no such thing as a gas OPEC. Russia may not produce gas to its full potential but its role in gas markets is a far cry from the role that Saudi Arabia has played in oil markets for decades. The painful last 2 years in oil markets are the long term normal for gas markets.
Gas transport is expensive (especially when it requires liquefaction), oil transport is cheap
Due to its low energy density, gas is much more expensive to transport than other fossil fuels. Transport of gas requires pipelines (for shorter distances) or liquefaction (for longer distances). It is especially LNG that incurs high costs. Only 30 % of LNG cost is related to feed-in gas; the bulk of the cost is related to liquefaction, transport and regasification. The total cost of transporting gas in the LNG chain is at least twice the cost of transporting via pipeline.
In any country where sufficient other sources of gas are available (whether conventional or unconventional) that can be transported by pipeline LNG faces an uphill battle. In Europe, US sourced LNG will have difficulty competing with lower cost Russian gas. In China, Australian sourced LNG will have to compete with Russian sourced gas and (in future) with locally sourced shale gas. LNG is the high cost gas that faces the most pain in periods of oversupply and low gas prices (equivalent to oil sands or Arctic oil in the world of oil). It used to be profitable – at a time when it functioned as a niche gas supplier to countries (e.g., Japan) that had no alternative options.
Gas faces stronger competition than oil
The most important use for oil is transport. Alternatives for oil are less readily available in the short term. Even for light vehicles a transition to electric vehicles will take considerable time. It remains to be seen if (and when) the use of electric vehicles can compensate for increased road transport on a global basis. Decades of increased fuel efficiency, for any form of transport, have as yet not resulted in peak oil demand. For heavy vehicles, airplanes and shipping a transition is even more difficult.
The most important use for gas is power generation, where coal and renewables are strong competitors. The low cost of coal remains a strong advantage, limiting the rate at which especially non OECD countries will move away from coal. Reduced costs and climate concerns result in renewables now making significant inroads – which is more of a concern for gas than for oil.
The only place where gas has a high and increasing share in power generation is the US. This is solely due to low cost shale gas – which does not help the majors in any way. In Europe gas is being squeezed in between coal (which still enjoys significant political support in Eastern Europe) and renewables. European gas demand is 20 % lower than what it was a decade ago.
Countries like China and India have so far chosen cheap coal for the bulk of its power generation. By now, should they want to start reducing the share of coal, they may move straight to renewables, bypassing gas. The IEA now expects gas to be responsible for only 8 % of Chinese power generation in 2040, up from the current 4 % but still way below a global average of about 23 %. Gas (and especially high cost imported LNG) is simply not the best compromise between cost, emissions and energy security for a country like China.
The majors are not making much progress in selling gas as a transition fuel. It is cleaner than coal and yet it remains a fossil fuel and methane emissions are subject to increasing public scrutiny.
Shale gas is a stronger competitor to gas than shale oil to oil
The BP long term scenarios have shale gas providing for about 25 % of the total gas supply on a global basis in 2035. Shale oil is only expected to provide for about 10 % of the total oil supply by that time. Other scenarios, such as those provided by the IEA, paint a similar picture.
The situation in the US, the only place where shale oil and gas are mature industries, provides the background for this. US shale gas is firmly established at the lower end of a gas cost curve. Since 2009, when shale gas took off in earnest, it has completely outcompeted conventional gas in the US. Shale oil, on the other hand, faces more of a struggle. Shale oil projects have a significant cost range but on average US shale oil is situated in the middle of the global oil cost curve.
Given the knowledge and efficiency of the US oil (service) industry any non US shale oil will be at a higher cost (and will struggle to reach the level of activity needed to bring down costs and establish sweet spots). Long term scenarios like those created by BP or the IEA expect non US shale gas to have a higher chance to take off than non US shale oil. For any place in the world where shale gas can overcome the technical issues in the early phase as well as public acceptance issues it may outcompete conventional gas (and in particular high cost LNG) as it has done in the US. This may be unlikely to happen in Europe but has a real chance of happening in China or Argentina.
The current LNG oversupply is more severe than the current oil oversupply
For oil, the difference between supply and demand over the last two years has not exceeded 2 million barrels / day (close to 2% of the total production). By now (June 2016) supply and demand are starting to approach a balanced situation. In anticipation of a further reduction of supply (related to the investment cuts over the last two years), oil prices have started to pick up and the lowest prices seems to be behind us.
For LNG, the length and intensity of the bust period of low prices is expected to be much more severe. By 2014, a well supplied LNG market became a buyer’s market, resulting in a significant drop in e.g. Asian spot prices in 2014. What is the most worrisome at the moment is the number of LNG projects that are now coming on the market. Global LNG exports are increasing from 233 m tonnes (2014) to 306 m tonnes (2016). The bulk of this increase comes from Australian projects – all destined for Asian markets that are at this moment hardly growing (by about 2 % per year only – much less than foreseen 5 – 10 years ago when these projects were sanctioned). This oversupply is of such magnitude that it is likely to lead to a prolonged period, at least to 2020, of LNG oversupply and low prices. Following large costs overruns, a recent Australian LNG project such as Gorgon runs the risk of becoming one of the worst projects from a financial point of view in the oil and gas industry since a long time. US LNG projects are having a significant cost advantage compared to greenfield Australian projects due to lower construction costs and lower costs of feed in gas (more than compensating for longer transport); with e.g. Japan delivery costs estimated to be about $ 11 / MMBtu versus $ 14.5 / MMBtu.
For the future, much will depend on how much output has been tied to the oil price (and of course how oil prices will evolve). In the present world of low oil prices gas spot prices tend to be relatively close to those of long term contracts. I would expect the outlook for oil prices to be better than that of LNG spot prices. More than 75 percent of all Asian gas import are priced at levels contractually linked to oil prices (versus less than 50 percent of European gas). In the long term there is a tendency to move away from oil linked prices to spot prices or hybrid pricing. At this stage Asian consumers are reluctant to sign any new oil-indexed NLG contracts. Part of the contracts that are being signed go to portfolio players rather than destination specific end users.
Europe is unlikely to absorb excess LNG on a significant scale. Gazprom is unlikely to cede market share. As a low cost producer they can undercut on price and they have significant spare capacity (cost levels of about $ 3.5 / MMBtu for existing Russian spare capacity, $ 5.5 / MMBtu for incremental Russian capacity versus approx $ 8 – 10 / MMBtu for US LNG). European LNG needs strong political support (for environmental or energy security concerns) in order to be successful.
In the long run, gas seems to be systematically less profitable than oil. In the short term, the current low LNG prices are expected to last a lot longer than the current low oil prices. In hindsight the majors would have been better off accepting a shrinking business with a more limited focus on gas and a much more limited focus on high cost LNG.
For a different perspective (but arriving at quite similar conclusions) I would recommend Karel Beckman’s paper on the 2015 World Gas conference. It contains some interesting observations on the oil and gas industry’s groupthink.